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The paper provides on overview of the Hungarian Convergence 
Programme (CP) that envisages the path to restore macroeconomic equilibrium 
during the next three years. The spiralling budget deficit in 2006 made an update 
of the previous CP inevitable. In the September 2006 version the government 
shows strong commitment to face up to the fiscal imbalances and structural 
problems, yet several aspects question the feasibility of the Programme. The 
paper focuses on the evaluation of the major objectives and their realisation 
during the first year of the CP as well as on significant technical assumptions and 
external factors that may constitute a downside risk for the implementation. 
Besides introducing a corrective fiscal package the Convergence Program draws 
the outlines of several, long-awaited reforms of almost the entire sphere of the 
social welfare systems. As the primary focus is on the feasibility of the budgetary 
consolidation strategy, the paper deals with these reforms only in the context of 





September 1, 2006 marked the deadline for Hungary`s first reelected 
government since 1990 to hand in the national Convergence Programme (CP) to 
the European Commission. The Programme endorses several painful adjustment 
measures in a frantic effort to put Hungary back on the balance track and to 
restore the credibility of the government in Brussels as well as on global financial 
markets. Besides drawing a scenario for reaching the Maastricht convergence 
criteria that is necessary for the Euro introduction, the CP also gives the broad 
outlines of the long awaited reforms of the social welfare systems. 
                                                 
1 Judit Szilágyi is Research assistant Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences. 
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This paper provides an overview of the first year of the Convergence 
Programme, its macroeconomic background, the major steps and the possible 
effects. The analysis of the possible future challenges and risks focuses on the 
years 2007-2009 as this is the key period of the Convergence Programme, at the 
end of which fiscal balance and sustainable economic growth is expected to be 
restored. The CP contains only rough numbers for the period 2010-2011, which 
largely depend on the implementation of the restrictions during the first three 
years of the Programme. The paper gives only a broad overview of the planned 
educational, health care and pension reforms and only in the context of the long-
term sustainablity of government finances as analysing all these areas and the 
feasibility of the reforms would be definitely far beyond the reach of this paper. 
 
The background of the Convergence Programme 
 
Election years do not usually enhance fiscal rigour but a roughly 10 % 
government deficit is still extraordinary. The Convergence Programme may 
finally break the „tradition” of election cycles that have been characteristic since 
the 1990s. (see Graph 1) 
 
Graph 1: Government deficit in percentage of GDP, not including FISIM 
 
Source: Hungarian Ministry of Finance 
 
The necessity of the measures outlined in the CP is out of question. The 
excessive twin deficit as well as the growing debt ratio made the economic path 
in 2006 unsustainable. Hungary’s macroeconomic performance is still the worst 
in the EU at the moment in terms of fulfilling the Maastricht convergence criteria, 
which has also created concerns in Brussels. Between 2007 and 2013 Hungary   85 
will receive 22.4 billion Euros development assistance from the EU
1 that can be 
at stake if the country does not show a macroeconomically sound and credible 
economic program to enhance convergence to the Maastricht criteria.  
The EU gave the September 2006 deadline for the submission of the 
revised Convergence Programme, thus stressing not only the urgent need for 
reforms but leaving no room for political manoeuvre until the local elections in October.  
Originally there were three scenarios to reduce the huge government 
deficit. The first visioned an extremely rapid adjustment, targeting the 3 percent 
criteria by 2008. The second, calculating with a relatively slow deficit reduction 
path, would have achieved this only by 2010. Finally, a third, relatively moderate 
slope was accepted that made 2009 the target date. This version is probably the 
most credible and realistic as an even more front-loaded effort would have raised 
a lot of concern about the feasibility of the Programme, while on the other hand, 
it was feared that with a relatively slower path the GDP growth rate would be 
stucked at a level of 2 percent for several years. 
The current Programme, last updated in December 2006 still outlines an 
ambitious plan to reduce the government deficit by 7.5 % (or by 6.8 %, after the 
corrections in the calculation) by the end of 2009. (See Table 1) Even with this 
substantial cut, deficit will be slightly higher (3.2 %) than the required 3 % 
threshold but the government hopes that Brussels will take into account a part of 
the net cost of the pension reform in line with the revised Stability and Growth 
Pact.
2 In the case of Hungary, in 2009 this would correspond to 20 % of the net 
cost of the pension reform or an estimated 0.3 % of the GDP. The majority of the 
reduction falls within the first two years of the CP (2007-2008), the first year 
alone accounting to almost half of the decrease. This means an extremely large 
burden assigned to the Hungarian economy and society.  
 
Table 1: Key indicators of the Convergence Programme 
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Budget deficit (%  -
Primary balance (%  c
Gen. govt. debt (%  6
CPI (change in %)  2
Source: Convergence Programme of Hungary 2006-2010, December 2006 pp. 15-18. 
                                                 
1 The total sum amounts to approx. 30 billion euros including rural development assistance. 
2 According to Council Regulation (EC) No. 1056/2005, if the general government deficit „[…] 
has declined substantioally and continously and has reached a level that come close to the 
reference value the Council and the Commission shold consider degressively the net cost of a 
pension reform that includes a fully funded pillar”.   86 
 
Evaluation of the major elements of the CP 
 
The key factor of the Convergence Programme is the steep and front-
loaded reduction of the large government deficit as mentioned above. The 
Programme has often been criticised for being too focused on increasing revenues 
and neglecting the expenditure side. (See Graph 2) Revenues will be increased 
mainly by larger tax centralisation including higher VAT, corporate and personal 
income taxes as well as the introduction of new taxes (e.g. the property tax). The 
government has also officially abandoned its five-year tax cut programme that 
would have lowered budget revenues by around 3 % of the GDP by 2010.  
 
Graph 2: Government deficit, revenues and expenditures in 
percentage of GDP (compared to the 2006 level without correction and not 
including EU transfers) 
 
  Source: Hungarian Ministry of Finance 
 
Regarding the expenditure side, the idea that the government should start 
saving money on itself has become quite popular. Public administration and 
generally governmental organizations definitely deserve some streamlining, 
which would drastically affect public employment. Approximately 200 public 
organizations face transformation during the following years and the whole 
public sector is expected to operate on a 14 % less budget and with about 20 % 
less employees. This will definitely affect the labor market, although the 
government hopes that it can be offset by a moderate growth of the business 
sector, thus letting the unemployment rate increase only on the short run. 
The CP broadly outlines the major directions of the long awaited reforms 
of the social welfare systems. The primary aim of these reforms is not only to cut 
expenses but also to improve the quality of public services provided by the 
central or local governments. There is no doubt that structural changes are   87 
inevitable, yet there is a lot of social resistance and suspition against the new 
measures. The complex reform of the educational, health care or pension systems 
is also on the agenda in old EU member states, however, the Hungarian social 
systems (and especially the pension system) constitutes an even higher risk 
regarding the sustainablilty of public finances. Hungary appears to be at an earlier 
stage of population ageing, and this, alongside with the still unresolved problems 
of the social welfare systems, threaten with long-term budgetary impacts. There 
are also voices of concern about the feasibility of the ambitious reforms while 
focusing on restoring the fiscal balance. Nevertheless, the greatest challenge that 
the Hungarian government faces nowadays is the successful and socially 
acceptable redefinition of the role of the state, meaning not only less 
redistributive and more market-driven solutions but also more effective and well-
coordinated action in several areas. 
An interesting point of the new Convergence Programme is the revised 
scenario for the public debt to GDP ratio, which is in sharp contrast with the 
previous versions. According to the current update of the CP, the gross 
government dept to GDP ratio is projected to significantly increase in 2006-2008 
reaching its top (71.3 %) in 2008. This temporary rise can only be turned around 
in 2009 with the improvement of the primary balance as well as the revitalised 
economy and falling yields. Despite not reaching the Maastricht threshold even at 
the end of the programme period, the government hopes that Brussels would take 
into account the constantly and steadily decreasing pace of the debt to GDP ratio. 
 
  Graph 3: Public debt to GDP ratio 
Source: Convergence Programme of Hungary 2005–2009 (September 2006) p. 35. 
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As for consumer prices, the Programme is highly optimistic by assuming 
that inflation will only temporarily accelerate during 2007 and than return to the 
previous path, though not reaching the expected Maastricht level for several 
years. However, recent estimations of the National Bank have projected CPI as 
high as 8.5 % for the first eight months of 2007, so the inflation target for this 
year will probably have to be updated again. On the other hand, minor divergence 
from the original numbers may be calculated with, as the National Bank itself sets 
only a mid-term inflation target (3 percent), thus leaving room for adjustment on 
the short run.  
Disinflation in the past few years in Hungary was partly artificial as it was 
partly due to regulated prices that kept especially energy prices lower than world 
prices (e.g. electricity, natural gas prices) and the VAT reduction that took place 
at the end of 2005. In line with the decision to transform the subsidy system for 
energy, pharmaceuticals, transportation prices as well as to raise the V/AT level 
of 15 % to 20 %, inflation will accelerate considerably in 2007. A stronger 
exchange rate and lower oil prices can influence this trend positively but the 
biggest responsibility still lies with the proper implementation and the credibility 
of the Convergence Programme as this can keep inflation expectations moderate. 
The document is often criticized for cautiously avoiding setting an exact 
date for the Euro adoption. However, Hungary stands not alone with this kind of 
mysterious unpredictability in the region. Poland has not even attempted to 
predict an official date, although there have already been unofficial statements of 
a 2012-2013 introduction. 2012 may also be the target date according to the new 
national plan of the Czech Republic, however, nothing seems to urge Prague 
either. It is still Slovakia that seems most determined to undertake the promise of 
the previous government about the 2009 accession, even postponing the 
fulfilment of several campaign slogans with this end. It is an interesting question 
why and how the once leading Central European group lost its comparative 
advantages in the ”Euro race”, even compared to the Baltic states.
1  
Although not announced officially, 2013 or more probably, 2014 can be 
the accession date for Hungary – provided that the measures of the CP will be 
implemented. Relatively late adoption of the Euro is not necessarily a drawback 
if policy makers finally realise that not premature, unprepared introduction, but a 
well-coordinated, predictable and credible pace of accession adjusted to the 
realistic economic and political capacities serves the country’s interests best. 
                                                 
1 Though having excellent fiscal indicators, Estonia and Latvia already had to postpone the 
introduction of the single currency as a result of high inflation rates. It is a common problem of the 
new member states trying to catch up quickly that due to their overheated economy and extremely 
high GDP growth rates (approx. 10 % in the Baltic states) they are unable to keep the inflation 
criterion.   89 
Credibility also remains a key element in determining the behaviour of foreign 
investors. If government measures are transparent and consistent with the major 
objectives of the national programs (including mainly the National Strategic 
Reference Framework besides the Convergence Programme), a relatively short 
delay will probably cause no direct threats. However, an even further delayed 
accession may result in the relative devaluation of Hungary’s position as well as a 
rearrangement of foreign direct investments that are vital for the Hungarian 
economy. 
The biggest question remains if the economy can recover from the surgery 
as quickly as it is supposed to according to the Programme. The CP assumes that 
GDP growth rates as well as inflation will be affected negatively only on the 
short run and the economy can return to its previous dynamism as early as 2009. 
This is extremely important as by 2006 Hungary fell behind in terms of GDP 
growth rate even among the Central European countries.  
 
Assumptions and external factors 
 
The assumptions of the Convergence Programme definitely include 
factors of uncertainty that may cause some divergence from the baseline results. 
There are basically five assumptions of the CP that either seem unrealistic or are 
far beyond the reach of the government.  
The first factor that cannot be influenced by the government but definitely 
plays a key role in the realisation of the Programme is world- and especially EU 
GDP growth. The CP relies on the forecast of the European Commission that 
assumes a 2.0 – 2.2 percent GDP growth rate for the years 2007-2009. Although 
this rate seems realistic for 2007 and according to recent projections, the EU GDP 
may reach even higher dynamism mainly due to the German economy
1, a 
possible slowdown may pose risks for the implementation of the Programme. 
A second and recently overdiscussed topic is the question of energy 
prices. The Programme calculates with stable oil prices using a model of 70 
USD/bbl for the period of 2007-2009. This can certainly be challenged by a sharp 
increase resembling that of last summer but the government assumes that a 15 
USD/barrel difference can be still managed within the baseline results of the 
Programme. Considering that a possible increase rather affects the current 
account balance than the amount of revenues, this optimism can be at least partly 
explained. 
                                                 
1 As a result of recent positive changes, the September version was slightly reviewed and the 
actual Program projects 2.2 – 2.4 percent EU GDP growth.   90 
However, there is no reason for such optimism in the case of investments 
and export dynamism. As apart from capital investments, growth will remain 
mainly export-driven in the following years, any negative changes may have 
large spill-over effects. The export projection is primarily based on the growth of 
external demand that is supposed to remain relatively stable, thus gradually 
reaching a better trade balance, with a possible surplus in 2011. On the one hand, 
the Hungarian export is quite vulnerable, with almost half of it originating from 
short production lines that are placed in Hungary only for a specific phase of the 
production. On the other hand, external demand and the growth of foreign 
markets largely depends on the growth of the EU economy. 
 
Graph 3: The growth rate of exports and export markets 
 
Source: Convergence Programme of Hungary 2006-2010, December 2006 
p.10. 
 
As for investments, household income and therefore available resources 
for investment will decline especially in the first two years of the CP due to the 
stabilisation measures and a temporarily higher inflation. However, according to 
the projections, investment ratio will reach 25 % by 2009, which seems too 
optimistic. The government hopes to enhance investment dynamism with the 
increased use of EU resources and cofinanced national investment projects, 
mainly in the fields of transportation systems, renewable energy sources and 
health infrastructure.  
A final assumption of the model is about the exchange rate – the 
Programme calculates with a technical rate of 271 HUF/Euro for the period of   91 
2007-2009.
1 Since 2001, Hungarian monetary policy has been focusing primarily 
on inflation targeting, accompanied by a wide-band pegged exchange rate system. 
The exchange rate may fluctuate against the Euro within a band of +/- 15 %. The 
national currency was markedly stable until the end of 2005, but fluctuated 
greatly during 2006, and there were even projections about a possible 300 
HUF/Euro rate. However, after the Commission and the Ecofin gave a positive 
response to the Convergence Programme, the exchange rate began to strengthen 
indicating the growing trust of the markets. The first two reports in April and 
September 2007 already calculated with a technical rate of 254 and 251 
HUF/Euro, respectively. Following significant appreciation of the national 
currency in the last few months the debt stock was effected very positively.
2 
Thus, the exchange rate seems to pose a smaller threat to the feasibility of the CP 
but this can change during a three-year period. 
 
Graph 4: The HUF/Euro exchange rate in 2006 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
 
A key element of the CP is the projected GDP growth that is partly 
derived from the assumptions described above. As a result of the fiscal 
consolidation, domestic demand will decrease sharply in the first two years of the 
Programme. GDP growth will significantly slow down and the real output level 
will drop below the potential output. As a result, the output gap will become 
negative, reaching approximately -2 % of the potential output in 2008-2009. 
                                                 
1 This data was also slightly modified as the previous version used an exchange rate of 272.5 
HUF/Euro. 
2 Approximately 30 % of the debt portfolio is denominated in foreign currency (essentially in 
Euro), so a 10 % exchange rate change would have about 2.0 percentage point impact on the debt 
ratio.   92 
According to the objectives of the CP, from 2009 real GDP growth will 
accelarate and rise to the level prevailing before 2007, which is a very positive 
scenario (see Table 2 for detailed data). The December version of the CP includes 
some slightly positive adjustments mainly due to the better global and Hungarian 
economic performance that gave birth to some even more optimistic projections 
assuming that the Hungarian economy can reach its growth potential even earlier 
than expected. However, even with these optimistic assumptions the possible 
growth sacrifice is significant, leaving a slightly negative output gap even in 
2011.
1 This growth sacrifice could be partly reduced by proper adjustment of the 
national development programs, mainly the National Strategic Reference 
Framework (NSRF – also called New Hungary Development Plan in Hungarian). 
The NSRF should focus on such economic programs that can have a positive 
impact already on the short run and strenghten economic growth by enhancing 
competitiveness, employment and domestic demand, thus making up for part of 
the negative effects of the CP.  
 
Table 2: GDP components and growth 
                           annual percentage change 
  2005  2006  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Household  3.8  2.4  -0.8  0.0 1.8 2.7 cca.3 
Government 
i
0.2 2.6  -1.6  -3.3  1.6  1.6  1.5-2 
Investment  5.6  2.8  2.4 4.0 7.5 6.8 6-8 
 Domestic 
i
1.4  2.0  0.3 0.7 3.3 3.7 cca.4 
Exports (goods and 
i)
11.6 14.3  10.6  9.7 9.4 9.3 8-10 
 Total  demand  5.3  6.8  4.6 4.7 6.2 6.4 6-7 
Imports (goods and 
services)  6.8  11.1  8.1 7.5 8.6 8.9 8-10 
  GDP (at 2005 year  4.2  4.0  2.2 2.6 4.2 4.3 cca.4.5 
 Potential  GDP  4.0  4.1  4.0 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.8 
  Output  gap  1.3  1.2  -0.6 -1.8 -1.5 -1.0 cca.  -0.5 
Source: Convergence Programme of Hungary, December 2006, pp. 9-13. 
 
The Convergence Programme also admits the relevance of the risks 
deriving from the factors mentioned above. Though it is based on assumptions 
                                                 
1 Data and estimation is based on the Convergence Program that uses the Cobb-Douglas 
production function for the calculation of the potential GDP following the methodological 
recommendation of the Commission.   93 
and estimations achievable with the highest certainty, calculations have also been 
made for different macroeconomic tendencies. The September version introduces 
for the first time alternative scenarios, namely four, reduced to three by the 
December update. They are based on mainly two variables: domestic and external 
demand.
1 The more positive and more negative projections basically fall within a 
+/- 0.3 percent band from the baseline scenario in terms of GDP growth 
difference, which means a maximum of -0.3-0.4 percentage point divergence for 
the budget balance (in percentage of GDP). According to government projections, 
this risk can be offset with reserves and reserve measures built into the budget. 
These include the newly introduced property tax or the equilibrium reserve that 
both account for approximately 0.3 percent of the GDP but are not shown on the 
revenue side yet. 
 
Evaluation of the first year of the Programme
2 
 
The government has to report every six months the results and drawbacks 
of the Convergence Programme to the Commission and the Council, also 
including the implementation of the structural reforms. The first report was due in 
April 2007 and adopted by the Council in July, while the second was just 
submitted at the end of September. Both reports stress that macroeconomic 
tendencies have developed largely along the path envisaged in the Convergence 
Programme, and in certain aspects, they even intruduce some slightly positive 
upgrades. (See Table 3) 
 
Table 3: Macroeconomic forecasts for 2007 
 
  CP 2006 Dec  2007 Apr  2007 Sept 
GDP growth (%)  2.2  2.2  2.2 
CPI (%)  6.2  7  7.5 
Budget deficit (% of GDP)  6.8  6.6  6.4 
Gross govt. dept (% of GDP)  67.5  66.2  65.5 
 
Sources: Hungarian Ministry of Finance: First and Second Report on the 
measures taken in response to Council recommendation of 10 October 2006 under 
Article 104(7) of the Treaty  
 
                                                 
1 The scenario based on higher oil prices and higher inflation was removed from the December 
update. 
2 Based on the First and Second Report on the measures taken in response to Council 
recommendation of 10 October 2006 under Article 104(7) of the Treaty (Published by the 
Hungarian Ministry of Finance)   94 
As for the GDP growth rate, the large-scale fiscal consolidation has 
resulted in expected output losses. In 2006 GDP growth rate was 3.9 %, which is 
only slightly below the potential growth rate, however gradually decelarated 
during the year and especially in the first half of 2007. For the second quarter, 
growth rate has only reached 1.2 % in contrast to 2.7 % for the first quarter of 
2007. 
On the expenditure side, GDP deceleration was caused mostly by the 
marked drop in final consumption, in particular in social transfers in kind, which 
were reduced significantly (by 9% in the first half of the year) by the cuts in 
health care expenditure. Despite the more than 6% real wage drop, household 
consumption expenditure has not declined considerably: households smoothed 
their consumption significantly. However, the most direct effect on the society 
has probably been the significant fall of real wages. In the first six months of 
2007, the real wage drop was more than 9% in the public sector and around 5% in 
the private sector. The higher-than-expected wage growth along with the higher 
employment growth in the private sector was partly due to the whitening of the 
business sector as a result of government measures taken in late 2006. 
In the first half of 2007, both exports and imports increased dynamically; 
net exports  continued to have a positive impact on GDP growth (1.4%). No 
drastic drop in external demand is expected for the second half-year, thus in the 
whole year, export may increase by about 15% and import by about 12%. The 
balance of goods and services trade is expected to produce an export surplus 
again, mostly because of the approximately 1 billion euro improvement in the 
trade balance over the previous year figure. Relating to these developments, the 
current account deficit may also be lower than the level indicated in the 
Convergence Programme, only slightly exceeding 4% of GDP. 
The investments in the economy were lower than projected in 2006 and 
their dynamism in 2007 continues to be surrounded by uncertainty. A decline is 
likely in state-financed investments, and no growth is projected in housing 
construction, a driving force behind the investments of households. In contrast, 
high capacity utilisation, growing EU transfers and a favourable export outlook 
may all have a positive impact on the willingness of businesses to invest. 
In the first eight months of the year, the average rate of inflation was 
8.5%. This trend is roughly in line with expectations, but it is above the forecast, 
mostly due to the fast price rises of certain non-processed food products. On the 
whole, the government measures of last autumn and early this year had the 
calculated inflationary effect. 
The most visible positive progress is in the fiscal numbers. The budget act 
set the general government deficit for 2007, in accordance with the Convergence 
Programme, at 6.8% of the GDP. The report on the implementation in April,   95 
reckoning on the positive changes that were emerging at the time, set out a deficit 
forecast of 6.6% that was further upgraded to 6.4 % in the second report. This 
was attributable to the surplus of tax and contribution revenues, which 
increasingly appears to be a permanent development, and to the tight control on 
expenditures, which in certain areas proved to be even lower than expected. 
Along with the lower deficit, the new projection contains a 0.4% of GDP higher 
risk reserve and central equilibrium reserve than the April figures. 
There are also signs of a possible slow-down of the rise of the public debt 
ratio. By the end of 2007 the September 2006 CP forecasted a 70.1 % debt ratio 
that was modified to  67.5 % in December and to 66.2 % in the April report. The 
last update showed even more positive intra-year developments. The exchange 
rate appreciated considerably, therefore, the technical exchange rate assumption 
used for the debt forecast is even stronger than the one in the April report. The 
actual debt ratio for the first eight months of 2007 was 65.5 % of the GDP, thus 
projecting a more modest rise than expected by the Convergence Programme. 
On the whole, both government reports state that progress was made 
along the path assumed by the Convergence Programme and it seems that the 
most crucial part of the front-loaded deficit reduction will be fulfilled by the end 
of this year. The Commission and Council opinions have also affirmed these 
positive developments, however warned that only a consistent, tight fiscal policy 
and coherent structural reforms may guarantee the long-term sustainability of the 
processes. 
The feasibility of the CP 
 
Besides the major challenges arising from the internal and external factors 
described above the key element of the Convergence Program is credibility. 
Credibility has several dimensions and aspects, the first of which is international. 
Although several slight downgrades in terms of credit rating have shown 
diminishing international confidence in Hungary, the Commission as well as the 
Ecofin indicated their support for the CP by the quick approval of the 
Programme. However, Hungary has to pay more attention to the consistency and 
the implementation of the measures. Especially the September 2006 version 
marked a large and negative update to the previous programmes while the 
December update along with the first and second reports in 2007 meant some 
slightly positive changes. (See Table 4) 
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Table 4: Divergence of the September 2006 CP from the 2005 update 
 
  
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Real GDP growth (%)  CP  2005  4.2 4.3 4.1 4.1 - 
  CP 2006 Sept 4.1 4.1 2.2 2.6 4.1 
Govt. deficit (% of  CP 2005  7.4 6.1 4.7 3.4 - 
  CP 2006 Sept 7.5 10.1  6.8 4.3 3.2 
Gen. govt. gross debt   CP  2005  61.5 63.0 63.2 62.3 - 
(% of GDP)  CP2006  Sept 62.3 68.5 71.3 72.3 70.4 
 
Source: Convergence Programme of Hungary 2005–2009 (September 2006). p. 63. 
 
On the other hand, domestic credibility and legitimacy of the CP is a more 
delicate issue. The success of the fiscal tightening will largely depend on the 
social capacity and willingness to accept the increased burden. As the example of 
the Slovenian inflation reduction has shown in recent years, quick and efficient 
measures can only be based on widespread social and economic consensus. As 
the majority of the Hungarian deficit reduction is based on increased taxation, the 
main issue will remain if all the expected tax revenues can be collected. The 
adjustment measures may push an even larger part of the society towards the grey 
and black economy, the size of which is already substantial. 
The incredibly low social acceptance of the government measures is 
mainly due to two factors. First, the center-right opposition suggests that there 
would be an alternative, less painful scenario for deficit reduction and social 
reforms without giving exact details and analysis about the alternative 
programmes. However, according to the logic of the Hungarian quasi-two party 
system, the opposition is not interested in taking part of the responsibility in the 
ongoing programmes, thus undermining any substantial changes or reforms that 
would require a qualified majority decision as well as ruining the possibility of 
any widespread social consensus. On the other hand, the ruling socialist – liberal 
democrat coalition is responsible not only for the major part of the broken 
equilibrium but also for the poor communication results. The majority of the 
Hungarian society does not understand the necessity of the programmes and even 
if they agree with the diagnosis of the major problems and some of the solution 
attempts, they do not see how these random, undeveloped measures will form a 
coherent and well-defined programme. 
Short-term fiscal consolidation is definitely easier than reaching long-term 
sustainablity of government finances and the social welfare systems. The   97 
government shows high commitment towards the implementation of the 
programmes and seems ready to perform tighter fiscal discipline. A recently 
passed act allowing only a surplus of the primary balance from 2008, as well as 
the close supervision of the EU can safeguard this.  
The feasibility of the structural reforms is a more complex issue. 
Economy as well as politics is made on double levels: besides a national one 
there exists a community level of decision-making. The community level can 
empower national governments to carry out difficult reforms, however, it may 
also serve as an excellent excuse for their failure to undertake unpopular policy 
decisions. Hopefully, the current reforms in Hungary will be rather fueled by 
Brussels` determination to welcome only economically sound new members in 
the Eurozone. Hungary has already paid a large price for having continuously 
postponed some vital reforms. If the present programme means no real, profound 
changes, just a new facelift on the old body of the social welfare system, that 
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